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Abstract: In the last period, especially before the current economic crisis 
began, the phenomenon of employees working long hours without been  
paid has been observed. This trend appears to have become stronger in the last 
15 years but there is ample evidence that the tendency began before then. While 
there have been various explanations put forward as to why employees work 
paid overtime, theoretical justification for working unpaid overtime by 
neoclassical economics seems to be fragile; deferred compensation theory, 
human capital theory, signalling, gift economy theory and Pareto Optimality 
analyses are not sufficient to explain the existence and persistence of unpaid 
overtime. Finally an analysis based on Political Economy’s principles is 
proposed; tendencies of surplus value extraction, capitalist restructuring and 
trade unions may be capable of comprehending this phenomenon. 
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1 Working time in economic theory 
Working time has been a hotly debated issue from the very birth of the science of 
economic theory and it continues to be a theme today which draws the attention of social 
scientists. From the end of 19th century until the beginning of the 20th century the main 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Rising unpaid overtime: a critical approach to existing theories 69    
 
    
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
issue in this discussion was whether a reduction of the hitherto long hours of work was 
beneficial or not for the economy. 
Classical political economy is based on the labour theory of value. It describes in 
what way all independent economic units are united and synchronised in order to produce 
and exchange with each other. Additionally, rationality and hedonism are taken as 
characteristics of economic beings. Rationality describes workers’ preferences too. 
Leisure time is an exchangeable good for workers. Income is also an exchangeable good. 
Workers’ preferences balance between leisure time and income, which have a 
competitive relationship with each other. For this reason, the ups and downs of working 
time are attributed to income or substitution effects for workers. Unpaid work is therefore 
an anomaly. 
Marx highlighted the fact that every commodity has both a use value and an exchange 
value. The former is used to describe its utility and the latter is used to describe the 
necessary labour for its production. His critique of classical political economy explained 
labour according to the value theory of abstract labour. Value here is the socially 
necessary working time for a commodity’s production, not the embodied labour of a 
concrete worker in a concrete industry (Marx, 1982). Marx also argued that profits come 
from unpaid workers’ labour. Marx showed that the working day is separated in two 
parts: the first one is creation of the workers’ wage and the rest is the surplus value which 
capitalists ‘steal’ from workers. Surplus value extraction can be relative or absolute: in 
the first case the working day remains stable, but the wage per hour is reduced, and in the 
second case there is a prolongation of the whole working day. For this reason it is to the 
advantage of capitalists to fight for a longer working day, smaller wages etc. Workers, on 
the other hand, struggle for a shorter day and/or higher wages. Consequently, both classes 
through their collective bodies fight on the question of work time too. However, there are 
upper and lower limits to work time: the physical limits set an upper bound, but 
production’s completion sets a lower bound. Consequently, work time is determined by 
the class struggle of capitalists and workers, taking into consideration technological 
improvements, improvements of productive techniques etc. Here unpaid work to the 
benefit of the employers is more easily explicable in terms of exploitation and workers 
weakness but still an issue to be explained fully. 
The marginalists, or the neoclassical school of thought, rejected the labour theory  
of value and replaced it with subjective value theory. Their analysis is based on  
prices, rather than values. Every commodity’s price is determined by its utility  
which is subjectively given by individuals. Economic relations are analysed based on 
“methodological individualism” where “social interactions are finally interactions 
between individuals” (Arrow, 1994). People are hedonists who maximise their utility 
(which is given and unchangeable) subject to their budget constraints. Additionally,  
an economy always tends to equilibrium; individuals exchange with each other to a  
point where no one can become better without someone else’s becoming worse off 
(Sraffa, 1960) with prices determined by demand and supply. As for working time, 
workers are assumed to have some constant preferences for this. Leisure time and 
working time (income) again have a competitive relationship with each other, because 
labour is considered to be a harmful process, and leisure a relieving one. Workers choose 
their proportion of work/ leisure in order to maximise their utility with the final outcome 
for the worker being a fair wage. Consequently, for years working time reduction or 
working time extension was explained by marginalists by the dominance of substitution 
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over income effects. But with the phenomenon of rising unpaid overtime marginalists 
face a problem in providing arguments and explanations for why this occurs.  
Paid overtime began with the existence of the regulation of work time. When the first 
factory laws took place it was expected that working time would be reduced. For decades 
there was a belief that work time was being reduced, and overtime was following the 
same tendency. However more recently in developed capitalist countries it has been 
argued that working time has started increasing again at least before the outburst of the 
current economic crisis. It is only recently that records have begun to be kept of unpaid 
overtime but this will add to the problem. We now find economists who argue that: 
• working time is increasing  
• paid overtime is increasing  
• unpaid overtime is increasing. 
The intention of this paper is to analyse these perceptions of working time extension and 
especially the increase of unpaid overtime. This is an important problem for orthodox 
economics since it does not have the analytical toolbox to see the fact that employees are 
subject to exploitation. From a political economy perspective this is more obvious. For 
these reasons, we will first consider this issue in the light of neoclassical perceptions.  
2 Unpaid overtime: evidence from developed countries and the existing 
theoretical explanations 
2.1 Detecting unpaid overtime 
Unpaid overtime has commonly been observed in the three last decades. Until  
then economic analysis has focused on questions of work time reduction. Since the  
early 1990s, this question has been reversed. Schor (1991, 1999) was the first major 
commentator who observed the increasing working time, after years of reduction,  
in her research on the American economy. This helped to re-ignite the ‘debate on 
working time’. Bell and Hart (1999) added some new evidence about working overtime. 
Most of the subsequent works then analyse the phenomenon of unpaid overtime as 
depending on a range of variables which are discussed below. 
In respect of working time Schor pointed out that Americans work 158 hours more 
per year – which means nearly an extra month of work each year – based on data from 
1969–1989 (Schor, 1999, p.2). Golden and Figart (2000) found that working hours per 
year have increased 4% since 1980 in the USA (p.16). So far as over time is concerned 
Hetrick (2000, p.30) argued that during the economic expansion of the 1990s employers 
in manufacturing industries were more likely than in previous recoveries to increase 
overtime hours among existing employees than to hire new workers. The majority of 
these scholars agree that this phenomenon is much more apparent and persistent in 
workers who are employed in what is called services and the tertiary sector, than in the 
secondary sector. However, this does not mean that manufacturing workers are not 
subjected to this working time extension as well.  
Golden and Figart (2000, p.16) showed that overtime hours have reached a record 
level in manufacturing. In these surveys, unionisation is a variable with a disputable 
impact; in some cases it serves to reduce working time leading to an increase overtime, 
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but in some other cases it just reduces overtime hours (Bell and Hart, 1999). Males work 
more long hours than females (Bell et al., 2000) and overtime varies among groups of 
workers; unskilled workers exhibit lower overtime, but skilled workers higher (Bauer and 
Zimmermann, 1999).  
These surveys suggest a pattern of unpaid overtime. Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) 
suggest that paid overtime work is in decline. White collar workers or workers with 
higher education demonstrate a kind of persistence in working unpaid long hours 
(Pannenberg, 2005; Anger, 2008). Unionised workers or workers in highly unionised 
countries do not work unpaid overtime or work less unpaid hours in comparison  
with the un-unionised (Bell et al., 2000). Workers with short tenure also work unpaid 
overtime (Anger, 2008) and also their unpaid overtime tends to be equal with paid  
(Bell et al., 2000). Unpaid overtime has been observed to be higher among temporary 
workers than among permanent by 60% (Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005). 
The increasing tendency of unpaid overtime has been detected by many 
commentators. However, there is poor evidence for unpaid overtime because few 
statistical data would be provided by firms for an issue which implies their offenses 
towards labour legislation. Our information is based mainly on Time Use Surveys and 
Household Panels. Additionally, a part of workers who are asked about their unpaid 
labour may hesitate to provide a positive answer or give further evidence in cases that 
surveys are conducted in their workplace. 
Since this phenomenon has been observed various explanations have been put 
forward but unpaid overtime has an inadequate theoretical explanation in mainstream 
economics not only due to the fact that has only been observed relatively recently but 
also because it creates an inherent problem in the context of the approaches defended by 
this stream of analysis. 
2.2 Classifying the theoretical approaches to unpaid overtime 
The phenomenon of unpaid overtime appears to violate one of the fundamental 
assumptions of neoclassical theory, that labour and capital receive their marginal 
products. Various explanations have therefore been put forward in order to prove the 
continued validity of the marginal theory of productivity. Neoclassical economists 
consider capital as an input equal to labour and profits consist of capital’s return while 
wages consist of labour’s contribution. For this reason there would be a total collapse of 
the theory if there were to be labour which is not paid. Neo-classical economists have 
therefore tried to develop mainstream theories defending either the view that unpaid 
overtime is somehow paid or there is no need for it to be paid, or even workers do not 
want to be paid. 
• Unpaid overtime and deferred compensation theory 
In this approach, based on neoclassical assumptions, labour is considered a simple input 
in production, which receives a wage corresponding to the workers’ marginal product. 
Unpaid overtime is considered to actually be paid and it consists of an investment whose 
compensation is deferred to the future. It is argued that since employees provide unpaid 
working hours the firm will increases its overall output and profits so that employees can 
be rewarded later with higher earnings or other benefits. Pannenberg (2005) claims that 
the term ‘unpaid’ overtime is not appropriate to describe this phenomenon. He argues that 
from the employees’ point of view these hours appear unpaid, but from an economic 
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point of view these hours are actually paid in the future with a potential promotion  
or a wage increase. A survey carried out for the UK by Campbell and Green (2002) 
claimed, for example, that an extra unpaid hour over 1991 to 1995 raised 1996 pay by 
approximately 4%, quite a lot more than the 1% marginal impact of paid overtime hours. 
The authors conclude that labour still receives what it ‘deserves’, sustaining one of the 
most fundamental assumptions of the neoclassical approach.  
• Unpaid overtime and human capital theory 
Another neoclassical based approach which has been put forward to interpret this 
phenomenon refers to human capital theory. Knowledge and education are factors which 
improve labour’s quality as an input of production. Knowledge acquisition and education 
are forms of human capital acquisition by which individuals gradually ‘concentrate’ a 
stock of human capital that will again be rewarded in the future (Booth et al., 2003). 
Working long hours is seen then as an investment, since this can be used to raise an 
individual’s productivity. This approach applies to cases where substitution effects are 
dominant rather than income effects. These substitution effects, which provide more 
future earnings than their present work, are more dominant than income effects,  
i.e., staying in job within contractual hours and receiving an analogous wage. Thus, 
highly educated employees, in particular, whose substitution effects are more evident 
than the income ones, work long hours in order to increase their return in terms of human 
capital investment, implying that labour also finally receives a fair reward corresponding 
to its marginal product. 
• Unpaid overtime as a Pareto improvement 
A third neoclassical based approach attributes the existence of unpaid overtime to a 
Pareto Improvement which takes place after economic bargaining between employees 
and employers. This does not involve assuming a typical Walrasian centralised market, 
where labour demand and labour supply meet to determine variables such as wages and 
employment. Instead in this model, workers and firms come together in a decentralised 
market with view to matching their preferences through bargaining. There is an aggregate 
production function, according to which employers maximise their profits while 
employees maximise their utility function with respect to their working time (wage) and 
leisure time. Pareto efficiency, or Pareto optimality, is a state of allocation of resources in 
which it is impossible to make any one individual better off without making at least one 
individual worse off. Workers and entrepreneurs are bargaining with each other to 
determine labour’s and capital’s rewards, which will eventually be their marginal 
products in terms of Pareto Efficiency. Thus, optimal wages, optimal working time limits 
and optimal working overtime premia are ultimately determined by this bargaining 
process. Institutions (governments, laws and agreements, trade unions) exogenously 
affect this bargaining procedure and ‘distort’ its optimal outcome. Working hours and 
premia may be determined either by a government law, or by union arrangements. When 
higher overtime premia are imposed, this becomes an inefficient situation in terms of 
Pareto Optimality. This leads employers and employees to new unofficial arrangements. 
According to these arrangements, employees ‘offer’ unpaid working hours in order to 
offset higher overtime premia to satisfy Pareto optimal conditions (Bell et al., 2000; 
Trejo, 2001).  
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Rising unpaid overtime: a critical approach to existing theories 73    
 
    
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
• Unpaid overtime as a signalling device 
A fourth approach based on neoclassical reasoning sees unpaid overtime functioning as a 
signalling device in an environment under uncertainty. In this approach there is also a 
decentralised market, where employees and workers bargain over wages and working 
hours. However, in the labour market there is imperfect information. Employers do not 
know their employees’ level of competence. A labour market can fail due since 
employers only have access to imperfect information about their workers’ quality. 
Employers do not know how consistent or productive their employees are so they may 
hire less productive employees. Thus, an adverse selection problem arises and according 
to the theory, agents are forced to use a device to resolve this inefficiency. 
Signalling involves a detection device which employees use in order to safeguard a 
labour market’s existence, avoid failure, and finally be hired by employers. Signalling is 
based on the axioms of Imperfect Information Dynamic Games. Players have access to an 
information set, not the total information. Unpaid overtime and employees’ tolerance 
towards working unpaid long hours is the information set which is necessary to send 
messages to employers. Sequential rationality characterises each player’s strategic 
profile. A strategy profile is sequentially rational at a particular information set for a 
particular belief system if, and only if, the expected payoff of the player whose 
information set it is maximal given the strategies played by all the other players. 
According to this strategic profile players maximise their utility given their beliefs in the 
game. This particular model was introduced by Akerlof (1970), who describes ways of 
solving Adverse Selection problems with asymmetric information, and adapted by 
Spence (1973) who specified these in the labour market. More specifically, this model is 
based on assumptions such as: 
• the existence of many identical potential firms that can hire workers 
• each firm produces the same output 
• firms use an identical constant returns to scale technology 
• firms use only one input, which is labour 
• firms are risk neutral and seek to maximise their ‘expected’ profits 
• firms act as price takers (Mass-Collel et al., 1995). 
Under this signalling process, employees are the senders and employers are the receivers. 
In the existing literature, there are ‘separating equilibria’; distinct types of employees 
choose distinct strategies; high ability workers can afford to work more unpaid overtime, 
while low ability workers cannot. This means that ultimately no one can pretend to be a 
different from their real type. In this case only employees of high ability can work a lot of 
unpaid overtime, while those of low quality cannot. Unpaid overtime is used, therefore, 
to show their employers details about employees personality at work; it may signify that 
employees who work unpaid overtime are able to undertake extra duties, or are more 
enthusiastic about their tasks etc. Employers after having received this signal can separate 
their employees and finally give benefits to those of high ability (Meyer and Wallette, 
2005; Anger, 2008).  
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   74 E. Papagiannaki    
 
    
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Screening is thus an additional detection device which is used by employers  
in order to resolve the inefficiencies caused also by imperfect information. This approach 
has been tested by Engellandt and Riphahn (2005) for data from Switzerland.  
• Unpaid overtime as a gift exchange 
An alternative approach presents unpaid overtime as a gift exchange between a worker 
and their employer. Although the approach seems to be a behaviouristic one, the idea of a 
gift exchange has been examined by an economic model. Here unpaid overtime is a gift 
on the behalf of employees towards their employers’ for their latter’s good behaviour. 
The gift exchange model has been also compared with models of exchanging 
commodities by Bell (1991). The difference between gifts and commodities is that a gift 
implies a social relationship between parties to the exchange, whereas commodities are 
exchanged with other commodities without obligating any person beyond the immediate 
exchange itself (Gregory, 1982). 
The gift exchange model is based on the critical assumption of a positive relationship 
between wages and worker effort levels (Gneezy and List, 2006). “Workers are assumed 
to respond to high wage levels by increasing their effort (positive reciprocity) and to low 
wage levels by decreasing their effort (negative reciprocity) to the minimum required,  
in retaliation for the low wage” (Akerlof, 1982). Gift exchange as a mode of exchange 
usually took place in pre-capitalist formations between tribes (Malinowski, 1922), but 
Akerlof (1982) introduced the gift idea in interpreting relations between employees and 
employers. In this approach, unpaid work consists of a gift which is offered to employers 
for high wages. Usually in gift economies a response to a gift is a counter gift of highest 
value to the original giver. According to Bell (1991) the time invested in the flow of gifts 
may be associated with time spent together or with time required to produce things of 
value to the other. In this model, the workers’ gift to employers is work in excess of the 
minimum work standard, while the employers’ gift to them is wages in excess of what 
they would get if they left this job (Akerlof, 1982). 
• Unpaid overtime as a result of organisational mechanism 
There is a final group of theories which encompass approaches relating the phenomenon 
of unpaid overtime to the organisation of production. According to this approach, unpaid 
overtime is related to uncertainty over a task completion (Bell et al., 2000). In complex 
professions there is uncertainty about the necessary working hours of a task. Thus, some 
workers may have to provide more working hours than their contract determines. 
However, uncertainty over task completion still holds in numerous professions so it is not 
clear why premia are not given to workers whose ‘tasks never end’. The issue does not 
concern task completion uncertainties as such but the fact that they are unpaid. 
In addition, there is an approach which connects ‘leadership’ roles with unpaid 
overtime. Workers with leadership roles may work more unpaid overtime. When workers 
are organised into teams, leaders usually cover various tasks of the less productive 
workers. Consequently, leading workers tend to work unpaid overtime in order not to 
lose their reputation or future benefits (Bell et al., 2000). This type of production 
organisation, by paying workers as a group does not have an impact only on unpaid 
overtime, but also on overtime generally and on working time extension.  
However, according to a recent work, Tseng (2011) “unpaid overtime can be analysed 
within the scope of ‘embeddedness’ theory. In embeddedness theory an economic 
decision relies on the environmental limitations rather than from perfect actions 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Rising unpaid overtime: a critical approach to existing theories 75    
 
    
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
independent from every situation”. Tseng added some new perspectives on unpaid 
overtime by drawing on cognitive, structural, cultural and political embeddedness and 
claiming a relationship of unpaid overtime with expectations and economic orientation 
(cognitive), moral norms and long-term orientation (cultural), organisational mechanisms 
and job design (structural), and supervisor influence, group cohesiveness and industrial 
relations (political).  
These last two approaches do not attempt to apologise for the existence of unpaid 
overtime, or to justify by claiming that it is actually paid, or to detach the wider economic 
meaning of the phenomenon by highlighting only the self-serving behaviour. Rather they 
attribute this phenomenon to the organisation of an economy and production.  
3 A critique of the proposed analyses 
All these different explanations of the unpaid overtime phenomenon may have some 
value in some particular cases. There is evidence that employees have worked unpaid 
overtime to signal their quality or to offer a gift for ‘generous’ employees. There is also 
evidence that some employees are rewarded with future earnings. However, these 
approaches all confront significant explanatory deficiencies which are critically examined 
below.  
3.1 General counter-arguments 
These theories all begin from a distorted perception of the nature of labour. Firstly, labour 
is not the simple input that neoclassical economics suggests. It is not a dead input, but a 
process which gives birth to new products, transforming ‘inputs’ into ‘outputs’. Actually, 
neoclassical economists see ‘utility value’ as a measure of ‘exchange value’ 
(Theocharakis, 2005). That is, instead of the Labour Theory of Value, they introduced  
the Subjective Theory of Value; exchange value does not depend on production  
process; labour power (workers’ capacities) which transforms values (inputs) to new 
values (output), does not determine products’ exchange values. Only utility value 
(individualistic perception of consumers) determines a product’s exchange value. Labour 
is the work of social beings’ and is subjected to social processes in which workers may 
form a discrete class with concrete interests. They do not only work, but also have 
opinions about the production process and society. They participate by thinking, 
improving their techniques, and demanding. In capitalism labour has been widely 
socialised because every single worker is related with the others, even if only in an 
indirect way. Under this socioeconomic formation labour has certainly been transformed 
into a commodity since workers sell it to capitalists in exchange of their wage. But it 
differs from other commodities, because employers pay workers their wage after their 
labour is spent whereas with other ‘inputs’ that are purchased before their use.  
Secondly, and in contradiction to the neoclassical assumption that workers are 
maximising their individual utility by choosing working time, wages, benefits etc,  
real workers are not the economic beings found in laboratory environment. However, 
workers’ ‘preferences’ are historically constructed. Labour wage is determined at specific 
levels through technological, economic, social, political and, more generally, historical 
processes (Marx, The Capital, 1977). For instance, when there is a new technological 
improvement which boosts workers’ productivity, their ‘preferences’ for wages may be 
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adjusted. Thus, they are led to demand higher wages, since within the same working day 
produces a higher output. 
Moreover, economic relations according to the core of neoclassical economics are 
analysed by “methodological individualism”; “social interactions are finally interactions 
between individuals” (Arrow, 1994). In fact they do not see any difference between 
acting individually and acting collectively. Even some neoclassical theories recognise 
these differences; “a major source of firms’ specific human capital derives from 
interaction skills acquired by members of work teams” (Doeringer and Priore, 1971). 
Despite the revised neoclassical models, the core of its philosophy is to deduct everything 
in individualism. However, in capitalism “the widespread socialisation of labour (took 
place) as large groups of workers came together in production” (Marx and Engels, 2008), 
creating new condition in people’s interactions. This led workers to include social 
demands in their agenda, rather than individual desires. 
Fourthly, these theories all lack the historical specificity to answer the question of 
why has this phenomenon appeared now? For years there was the sense that working time 
could only be reduced. There is therefore no answer to the question of why working time 
a change has occurred so that overtime and more specifically unpaid overtime has risen in 
recent years. This issue has been analysed with respect to changes in capitalist 
restructuring; the organisation of production etc which leads to changes in labour process. 
Van Echtelt et al. (2007), for example, refers to the post-fordist organisation of economy 
as an important factor leading to unpaid overtime. But as a consequence, we have then 
have to provide an explanation that gives an historical basis to such a shift. 
3.2 Specific counter-arguments 
• Unpaid overtime and deferred compensation theory 
Employers in their efforts to maximise their profits minimise their costs. Labour cost 
includes wages, benefits, insurance and overtime premia. This theory claims that workers 
will be compensated in the future instead of the present. A possible reason for this is that 
employers want to postpone their present cost and transfer it to the future where their 
profits may be higher. Thus the percentage of labour cost would appear lower so by this 
procedure the capitalists earn two things: firstly, they ‘escape’ from paying an important 
amount of labour cost in the present and secondly, they face paying a lower percentage of 
labour cost in the future after increased profits. Workers forfeit their present payment 
after having expended extra physical and mental effort and additionally, their future 
compensation may not be in proportion to the increased profits. 
Employers too face uncertainty about their future profits. If they could be sure that 
their company would obtain higher profits then there should be no problem in paying 
workers’ overtime premia in present. However, employers use free labour because they 
also have in mind a potential for stagnation or failure. With unpaid labour they reduce the 
cost of this negative potential. Employees on the other hand work unpaid hours, which 
have no guarantee of being compensated in the future.  
Even in cases of increased profits it is not certain that employees will receive 
appropriate compensation. As we saw Campbell and Green (2002) claimed on the basis 
of a survey carried out for UK, that an extra unpaid hour between 1991 to 1995 raised 
1996 pay by 4%. But it is not clear that this equates to the marginal product of such 
labour. Let us take the case of an employee who works 8 hours. An extra hour would 
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mean 8 + 1 = 9. Thus, this worker initially offers 1 : 9 = 11% of their time without any 
compensation. This means that the worker has spent 11% of their time to receive a 
potential of only 4% higher earnings. This is a potentially disproportional exchange in 
which employees may work more in the present without being paid proportionately in the 
future. 
Equally, the cases where employees are compensated with promotions or with 
avoiding potential lay-offs are problematic. It is obvious that employees who have not 
succeeded in being rewarded or keeping their jobs will have worked numerous real 
unpaid hours. In restructurings even the successful employees who remain at their jobs 
may not be compensated and for those laid off there is no compensation at all.  
Finally, empirical testing does not support the deferred compensation hypothesis. 
Anger (2005a, 2005b) showed that from 1993 to 2004 in Germany, unpaid overtime 
hours could not be seen as an investment, since there is little evidence for future wage 
growth and promotion, and it did not help to prevent future lay-offs. In addition, Meyer 
and Wallette (2005) did not find evidence for future benefits from working overtime. 
They tested the impact of overtime on the transition from temporary jobs to open-ended 
jobs, and the existence of any positive result that signalling device. They focused both on 
‘presentism’ (staying long hours in work) and ‘absenteeism’ (leave from work usually 
due to supposed illness). Their findings indicate that ‘absenteeism’ had, in general, no 
effect on the probability of exiting to either a permanent job or to unemployment” (Meyer 
and Wallette, 2005). 
For these reasons, the theory of deferred compensation appears to have both 
analytical and empirical difficulties in explaining unpaid overtime. This is so especially if 
we take into consideration the on-going crisis where numerous firms have shut down 
leaving millions unemployed of workers. From the worker’s perspective all the hours 
they ‘invested’ in unpaid labour have disappeared ‘down the drain’.  
• Unpaid overtime and human capital theory 
When we turn to human capital approaches then in addition to the problems mentioned 
above we have to highlight that knowledge acquisition cannot be seen as something that 
improves only a workers’ individual quality – it is a factor with great impact on 
improving the production process as a whole. 
Knowledge acquisition has multiple positive effects on production. Workers, 
scientists, artisans throughout history have elaborated tools, invented machinery, 
conceived nature’s laws etc. The majority of this knowledge acquisition has taken place 
and takes place in workplaces, in households, in laboratories etc. Knowledge in this sense 
can be hardly characterised as belonging to ‘someone’ since it is a social product. Any 
employers’ property rights relate to a socially, or collectively derived output. If the 
argument is that they have sole rights then perhaps they should invoice their employees 
for any new knowledge that is acquired by them regardless their tenure?  
Workers may invest in themselves by acquiring new knowledge in their jobs, but this 
‘investment’ is useful for employers too. An employee’s increased productivity 
contributes to increased output with the same cost which leads to more profits. 
Employees both learn from this procedure and they work. Even in cases where training 
takes place or a company uses its resources to teach employees, this has multiple effects 
on their future performance too. Employees “learn by working and producing” and do not 
“learn by just wasting company’s assets”.  
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It is claimed that in cases of workers’ mistakes due to the lack of knowledge, that 
employers have to be protected. In every workplace mistakes can happen, especially by 
the new entrants or the untrained staff. But charging in advance for the knowledge that 
will be acquired by workers is equivalent to saying “Pay for your training! Otherwise I, 
the employer, will be damaged!”. Usually the side which benefits more from this training 
might be expected to pay. Moreover, making mistakes is inherent in the human factor and 
both all workers and all employers can make mistakes. Workers mistakes on their own 
are unlikely to put the company in jeopardy. Usually, workers’ serious mistakes take 
place mainly when there is poor security policy, or limited controls. At least in this case 
new entrants should not be charged with highly responsible duties. Even then, employers 
hardly have the right to anticipate them in advance for all workers by making them pay 
with various penalties. With the potentially more serious employers’ mistakes which can 
lead companies to bankruptcy workers have no equivalent means to protect themselves. 
Human capital acquisition can also take place either within contractual hours as an 
integrated process or out of contractual hours as separate subsidised special sessions for 
which employees must be compensated for spending their leisure time. There is no reason 
for depriving employees from their leisure time without pay. Employers can teach their 
employees without using free labour. In cases where they cannot deliver lessons in the 
existing work time then employers have to accept that extra working hours which 
contribute to their profits must have a paid return to labour. If they cannot pay extra 
working hours then employers should be restricted to training their employees within 
their standard contractual hours.  
Unpaid overtime is also not only a phenomenon of the newly entrant workers or the 
untrained. It extends to a wide range of workers. Human capital theory was tested by 
Anger (2008) and was not found “capable of explaining earnings differentials between 
workers”. In such empirical tests there is no evidence which shows that unpaid overtime 
is a unique phenomenon in new-entrants or young workers. But the data does suggest that 
new-entrants work unpaid overtime more than the rest. However this seems more easily 
explained by the fact that they are a vulnerable group of workers. In order to remain in 
their jobs cannot easily react to violations of their contracts by their employers. 
• Unpaid overtime as a Pareto improvement 
The Pareto improvement approach admits that employees and employers are different 
groups with conflicting ‘preferences’ in work time limits and wages. But it still does not 
consider their institutions as endogenous factors. This theory cannot see the social and 
political continuities in these two groups. Unions, organisations and government are 
examined without connecting them to their economic base and any contradictory interests 
of capitalists and the working class. Thus, beyond the neoclassical assumptions on which 
this theory is based, its most serious problem is to ‘extract’ the endogenously economic 
nature of class organisations and call them exogenous factors. 
According to this approach workers and employers appear to bargain from equal 
positions. However, one of these groups has more power to set its terms. Employers  
own the means of production, but workers own their labour power. The former gain 
profits from this process and the later only their wage. Employers can choose how many 
employees to hire and whom. Workers have to choose between unemployment or bad 
contacts and fulfilling contracts. Employers offer job positions while employees  
demand them. In the case of filling a job vacancy with a low productive employee 
employers face, in the worst case, lower profits. On the other hand, if an employee has a 
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low productivity or does not reach firm’s standards they can face the potential of being 
fired. Filling a job position is important for employers in order to safeguard their profits. 
On the other hand, a job is important for an employee to secure their survival. Even in 
case of firms’ bankruptcy, employers are offered by legislations limited liability, securing 
them not to pay debts to their employees or to other stakeholders; their company may not 
be saved, but most of their accumulated savings are quite protected. If we want to look 
further employers can use their power to influence politicians by financing their 
campaigns. Employers have no such a capacity; they are restricted to electing politicians. 
Employees can form unions pressing the governments, but unions are not lawmakers. 
Thus, employees bargain from different and unequal positions in comparison to their 
employers.  
Even if employees have some degree of liberty before signing the contract this liberty 
is missing once employees start working after the initial bargain. Disagreement on 
contract conditions within a job and searching for another job is difficult. An employees’ 
individual bargaining power is extremely restricted. Employees cannot impose their 
desire for an increased wage, but the cases are numerous where employers have made 
(legal) wage cuts. Employers are able to fire their employees regardless of signed 
contracts. So the supposed move to a Pareto Optimal choice is not a result of equal 
bargaining powers, but subject to employees’ limited choices before and after signing 
their contract. 
One way that workers can press for better conditions, higher wages, smaller working 
day is by organising but higher wages, overtime premia and other benefits are not always 
found in a government’s or a union agenda. Unions are only a means of social, political 
and economic pressure, they are not constitutional bodies which can exert official power. 
A union’s ideological composition varies – there are unions that serve employers interests 
persuading workers to accept low wages and higher working time limits, while there are 
also unions that are more radical. Additionally, the level of participation in unions differs 
between countries. There are countries with higher participation, such as the 
Scandinavian countries, and others with continuously low levels of participation, such as 
Turkey. Thus, even with union pressure high overtime premia are not likely to be 
imposed in every sector of all economies. Even within the logic of the Pareto Optimality 
argument we have to allow for the possibility that bargaining may make employees worse 
off by depriving them of their overtime payments, while it makes employers better off by 
letting them use a costless input.  
• Unpaid overtime as a signalling device 
In the signalling approach workers sacrifice their leisure time and its payment, not to 
receive a payment in future but to send a message. The extra units of labour input remain 
unpaid in order to convince employers that the worker is useful yet the free working 
hours contribute to companies’ output and profits. If workers were sure that their high 
productivity and their enthusiasm would be enough to convince their employers to keep 
them in job, or give them a promotion then they would probably not offer any extra 
unpaid hour. Nor does such signalling have much relation to skills sets. For instance a 
PhD holder employed in office administration may do the same job as a much lower 
skilled employee but still has to work unpaid overtime to convince her employer about 
their high ability. Such cases of skills imbalance, where employees’ tasks do not 
correspond to their abilities, put a question over the labour market as a whole. It seems 
more likely that the reason high ability workers might work unpaid overtime relates more 
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to economic factors, such as the tough competition between employees in the workplaces 
and high levels of unemployment for highly skilled workers.  
When workers are employed in jobs corresponding to their abilities such economic 
factors continue to play a role. If there is only a communicative cause and no economic 
reason for working unpaid overtime (fear of unemployment or not getting a promotion), 
then this piece of information could also be acquired while employees worked within a 
normal 8 hours. Workers can show their abilities within contractual hours too, no less 
than acquire human capital in these hours and without reducing labour costs for the 
employer by accepting unpaid overtime. Within the theory it is unclear why employers 
cannot be informed about employees’ willingness within the work contract and a fair 
wage.  
If in neoclassical terms signalling is used to solve’ inefficiencies’ caused by 
‘imperfect information’ then it also leads to new inefficiencies. By using unpaid long 
hours as a signalling device precious effort is wasted inefficiently as employees sacrifice 
their leisure time without any compensation. Thus, a new inefficiency is created to solve 
the previous lack of information. Moreover a second inefficiency then arises in as much 
as all these extra working hours, if they were paid, could have been allocated to 
unemployed.  
The approach also has empirical weaknesses. Anger’s (2008) own empirical analysis 
again did not give clear evidence that unpaid overtime can actually acts as a signalling 
device; in West Germany there was some evidence for a positive signalling result for the 
workers, but a negative one was found for East Germany.  
• Unpaid overtime as a gift exchange 
Exchanging gifts is not the same thing as exchanging commodities. Both are a product of 
specific socio-economic systems. Under capitalism the capitalists own means of 
production and employ workers to produce commodities. These commodities then 
become the symbol of their relationship (Marx, 1982). The ‘gift economy’ worked in a 
period of time when the market was not the dominant means of exchanging products and 
social relationships were more personal. It can be claimed that gift economy consists of a 
more ‘primitive’ way of exchanging goods. However, personal relations are also more 
immediate. Persons belong to tribes caring about their collective welfare. They work, 
produce, consume, love and get married within this close group of people, taking 
seriously their reputation. Consequently, in a gift economy people maximise the 
collective welfare directly, while in the contemporary economy the theory is that they do 
so indirectly as a product of the egoism. The gift economy and its organisation precedes 
the dominance of exchange one. Economic and personal relations have not been 
distinguished yet whereas the commodity economy requires the substitution of social 
relations with commodity relations (Bell, 1991). 
Differences in the role of labour arise from these different logics. In the gift economy 
time spent in labour is not clearly separate from time spent in other activities. Gifts 
cannot be exchanged according to their value and cultural factors play a major role on the 
way of exchange. The time invested in the flow of gifts is more diffused and not 
distinguished from the time spent in consumption, in free time, in family time etc.  
In market economies this distinction of time has already taken place. Commodities are 
the immediate result of time spent in labour. Both gifts and commodities have value since 
they are produced by humans, but as soon as the process of distinguishing peoples’ time 
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into working time and resting time begins then commodities start to be exchanged more 
or less at their value.  
In gift economies there is no market for labour either. Labour is transformed to an 
exchangeable good only in capitalism. For this reason, offering unpaid working hours as 
a gift in an economic system that has distinguished personal from working relationships 
is surprising and it seems more sensible to see this as coerced say by the fear of 
unemployment. Besides, an exchange which takes place under the fear of unemployment, 
may not be a gift, with its benevolent meaning, but a ‘tribute’ to employers. Additionally, 
even if we interpret the phenomenon of unpaid overtime according to the gift model, the 
gift exchange stops with the employers after they have received what they wanted 
(unpaid overtime). We do not see any counter-gift that is greater (e.g., a much higher 
wage) than the gift already received.  
Employees and employers’ unequal socioeconomic position prevents them from 
benevolently exchanging gifts. Exchanging gifts is suspicious if we have in mind that 
employees own only their labour power, while the employers own means of production. 
This also means that employers can use human resources techniques and strategies to 
manipulate and ‘convince’ employees to over commit. These incentives may be a 
material but they can often be ‘moral’ or ‘idealistic’ as with ideas of workers acting as 
entrepreneurs. Employees can then feel ‘obliged’ to respond to these offers, by providing 
unpaid work. It is not surprising then that Anger’s (2008), attempt to test gift exchange 
theory did not find it “capable of explaining earnings differentials between workers”. 
• Unpaid overtime as a result of organisational mechanism 
Seeing unpaid overtime in the context of changes in organisational mechanisms seems a 
much more appropriate way forward (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). But we still need 
to understand what lies behind these changes and why they take the form that they do. 
The main reasons behind rising unpaid overtime may lie more in the capitalist 
restructuring which has been taking place. But this needs to be understood on the basis of 
a different philosophical and methodological approach to those previously discussed.  
4 Working time extension and unpaid overtime: potential explanations 
The difficulty of all the approaches that we have examined is that they look to explain 
unpaid labour in terms of its mutual advantage to both the employer and the worker. But 
from a political economy perspective this is not necessary. Here the capitalist’s profits 
come from workers’ unpaid labour. The greater this amount the greater the potential 
profit. Absolute surplus value extraction takes places when the whole working day is 
extended, keeping the wages at the same (at least) level. Consequently, unpaid overtime 
is a typical form of absolute surplus value extraction; the working day is extended, while 
wages are kept stable.  
In the labour theory of value the extraction of relative surplus-value has a limit;  
a minimum wage has to be paid to the worker for his survival. On the other hand, 
absolute surplus value has a limit too. No worker can work more than 24 hours per day, 
since a day has only 24 hours. However, capitalists try both to pay low minimum wages 
and to prolong the whole working day. In Marxist terms the exploitation rate or surplus 
value rate, s/v, can be intensified to a degree.  
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At the same time, capitalists in order to gain grounds over their competitors (either 
intra- or inter-sectorally), try to introduce new technology by minimising the number of 
workers and increasing the value of constant capital. Thus, the organic composition of 
capital c/v has a tendency to increase intertemporarily. Additionally, there are no obvious 
restrictions which set the limits for this rate not to increase. Consequently, the rate of 
profit, which is defined by the rate of exploitation (surplus value rate) over the 
composition of capital tends to fall. 
1
s
s vp p
cc v
v
= ⇒ =
+  
+  
 
where p = rate of profit, s = rate of surplus value, v = variable capital (wages), c = stable 
capital. 
If we allow for there being an inherent conflict of interest over wages and profit  
then the logic of unpaid labour becomes clearer as does the potential struggle over hours 
of work. The question then becomes why we observe this tendency of working time 
extension (and especially its unpaid part) in the last 15–30 years – as opposed to a 
reduction in previous periods? 
During the last 50 years, and especially since the mid 1970s, it has been argued that 
the rate of profit has been falling. This is suggested by a number of commentators to have 
been at the core of changes in capitalism and its processes. According to Harman (2007) 
and Maniatis (2012), there is evidence of this tendency of rate of profit to fall, based on 
data from USA, Germany, and Japan. Capitalists, in order to balance the effects of a 
falling rate of profit (p), among their other initiatives attempt to increase rate of surplus 
value (S/V) (Figure 1). 
After the 1973 extended recession, and from the mid 1970s, it has been argued that, 
capitalists in order to balance this falling tendency in their rates of profits have  
been under pressure to restructure their businesses. During restructurings, different 
geographical, financial, product and organisational changes can take place (Silver, 2003). 
Capitalists move their business geographically, consolidate them, develop new products, 
or improve techniques and ways of exploiting the working class.  
• Changes in the organisation of production – capitalist restructuring 
Capitalist restructuring takes place in order to eliminate fixed costs; production units are 
transferred to places of the world where their costs are smaller; new cheaper products  
are introduced in the market; the huge factories of the past give way to smaller 
enterprises (Smeds, 1994; Tauss, 2012). Sub-contracting has increased for the same 
reasons. Subsequently, after the creation of lean enterprises and the elimination of fixed 
costs, the number of workers that are necessary has also decreased creating the 
possibilities changes in the labour process too. Tasks higher in quality and quantity are 
undertaken by fewer workers; the old Taylorist-Fordist system in a lot of industries 
(especially in services) shifts to what some scholars call Post-Fordism. Consequently,  
the material conditions are created in order to facilitate the increase of unpaid working 
hours.  
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Figure 1 Rate of surplus value (s/v) and profit-wage ratio (π/w) (see online version for colours) 
 
Source: Maniatis (2012) based on data from BEA, NIPA, Π = net operating 
surplus, Table 1. 10, line 11, W = compensation of employees in 
private industries, Table 6.2, line 3 
• The introduction of information technologies 
Capitalist restructuring has also given a push to technological improvements. The 
introduction of information technology has changed the organisation of production. 
However, despite what many scholars of the Theory of New Economy maintain,  
it has not been responsible for changing the whole architecture of capitalism.  
The ‘Solow Paradox’ (Solow, 1987), suggests that although there has been a great 
investment in information technology, this has led only to an extremely small increase in 
productivity of labour and the sphere of production has changed to a smaller degree.  
But in the sphere of exchange (more than in the sphere of production) these new 
technological accomplishments have been adopted to a greater degree. In the so-called 
service sector, information technology has led, especially in administration and logistics, 
to greater tasks being undertaken by a smaller number of workers with a consequent 
intensification of labour. The introduction of information technology here plays a 
significant role in enhancing the capitalist control of the labour process. In consequence, 
an increase in the rate of exploitation is achieved. At the same time, it enables economies 
of scale in the use of constant capital. In this sense, flexible labour represents an 
outstanding restructuring of the labour process. With flexible labour a new balance 
between relative and absolute surplus value develops. During recent years absolute 
surplus value extraction has been strengthened (Mavroudeas, 1999). One direct method 
of this extraction is altering total labour-time. In this case, this extraction comes from 
working time extension and especially by unpaid overtime. However, it should be noted 
that (although further research has to be done) that during the current crisis, in USA and 
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Europe working hours seem to have been reduced, giving again the determinant role to 
relative surplus value extraction. 
• ‘Tertiary sector’ labour gains grounds over ‘secondary sector’ 
Some scholars also argue that tertiary sector workers, service sector workers, highly 
educated or white collar workers work more long hours (both paid and unpaid) than blue 
collar manufacturing workers, skilled and unskilled. It has been argued that the 1990s 
profit expansion was based on the overtime labour of manufacturing workers, and some 
even suggest that manufacturing overtime reached record levels (Hetrick, 2000). This 
indicates the need for further research into the question of whether the phenomenon of 
unpaid overtime is taking place primarily in ‘tertiary sector’ or non-productive jobs. We 
will hypothesise that unpaid labour is more prevalent in the tertiary sector. There are 
physical limits which do not permit an increase in overtime in manual jobs, such as in the 
majority of ‘secondary’ sector jobs in manufacturing industry. Manual work cannot be as 
easily extended as mental. Moreover, in last decades, the tertiary sector has increased in 
comparison to the secondary one so that the sphere of exchange has gained grounds over 
the sphere of production. Consequently, the numbers of ‘mental’ workers are greater 
making the phenomenon of unpaid overtime a possible potential for the majority of 
employees unlike in the era when manufacturing employment dominated. 
• Deregulation of the labour market 
Capitalist restructuring has also been used by states to reduced the freedoms and legal 
rights of organised labour. After the 1973 recession, and the years of the implementation 
of Keynesian policies by governments, employers successfully pushed for less  
state intervention in the labour market. The deregulation of working relationships, 
especially since the 1980s, has taken place on a widespread scale. Deregulation made 
cheaper overtime payments, or no overtime payment at all (unpaid overtime) possible. 
The UK and the USA were the pioneers in this labour market deregulation, initially by 
making working relations more flexible through the implementation of laws and acts  
that restrict labour unions’ bargaining power (Thatcherism and Reaganomics). But there 
are continuing examples which reinforce this deregulation such as work-sharing, 
‘flexicurity’, the distinction between active and inactive working time.  
• The weakening of labour unions 
Capitalist restructuring and the deregulation of the labour market have also had their 
impact on labour unions. The labour process has been turned into a more competitive 
than cooperative one with the Fordist ‘chain’ of workers giving way to groups and 
employees who compete more with each other. Additionally, in the UK labour market 
deregulation began with an attack on Trade Unions (Thatcher’s Trade Union Acts of the 
1980s). Historically we have seen that the reduction of working time was included in the 
demands of organised workers. The weakness of trade unions’ bargaining position and a 
strengthening of employers’ position is therefore important. But historically labour 
unions have also served both as mechanisms to transmit workers’ demands and 
mechanisms to absorb demands and to set the balance between capital and labour in 
favour of the former. In considering the weakening of labour unions we need, therefore, 
to focus both on unions’ participation, and on unions’ demands and policy.  
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Trade unions not only play an important role in the whole economy, but also a 
particular one in each industry and sector. Unionised workers in the same industry can 
achieve some rights in comparison with those who are not unionised. “Workers who 
belong to unions earn higher wages, work few hours, receive more training, and have 
longer job tenure on average, than their non-unionised counterparts” (Aidt and 
Tzannatos, 2002). Scholars who study the phenomenon of unpaid overtime have also 
found that participation in unions increase workers’ possibilities of receiving overtime 
premia (Bell et al., 2000). 
The available indices concerning unions such as union density, bargaining 
centralisation, demands etc all point to the recent weakening. In Europe and the USA 
there has been a serious decrease in union density. His weakening of bargaining power 
has had consequences for working time extension and particularly the rise of unpaid 
overtime. In 1977, according to USA data, for example, over one in five union members 
had collective bargaining agreements which restricted mandatory overtime. But, as many 
unions have lost membership, and in particular those in the manufacturing and 
communication industries, workers’ bargaining power to obtain such contract provisions 
may have diminished (Golden and Jorgensen, 2002). 
5 Conclusions 
Working time was always a very important part of economic analysis. Until now scholars 
have tried to explain the causes of working time reduction. However, in recent years the 
opposite tendency has appeared. Working time has been observed to have increased; at 
least until the start of the current crisis. Consequently, those schools of economic thought 
which argued that working time must decrease face theoretical problems. In particular, 
not only has working time extension appeared, but so also has the phenomenon of unpaid 
overtime. This has stimulated neoclassical economics to find new approaches which can 
explain this phenomenon: theories of differed compensation, human capital, Pareto 
improvement and signalling emerged to explain unpaid overtime. But in our critique, we 
have argued that these founder because they consider that labour is a simple input in 
production process, neglecting its social character. Even in their own terms these theories 
lead us to cast doubt on the basic neoclassical assumption that the labour wage is the 
reward for labour’s contribution.  
Instead we argue that working time extension generally, and unpaid overtime in 
particular, are forms of absolute surplus value extraction. In addition we have observed 
this phenomenon, especially in recent decades, has arisen for particular reasons which we 
can relate to the decline of the rate of profit. This has pressed capitalists to implement 
radical changes in the production process by changes in production organisation; the 
introduction of information technology in the sphere of exchange; the rise of the service 
sector over productive one etc. This restructuring has also been accompanied by 
institutional changes with labour market deregulation. The weakening of unions during 
recent years due to these structural changes has led workers to a situation of more 
restricted bargaining power. Consequently, employees cannot make as effective demands 
for a possible working time reduction or to be rewarded for the labour which they ‘have 
offered’. All these factors play a determinant role in working time extension and 
particularly in the rising phenomenon of unpaid overtime. 
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